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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the January 29, 1997, decision handed down by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of
Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes,1 there were a handful of cases that
addressed the creation of condominium units. The most important of these
cases were decided in the second and fourth districts and were at odds with
one another, despite that various sections of the Florida Statutes adequately
address and control precisely when a condominium unit is considered
created. While the second district was consistent in two of its most
important cases on this topic, the fourth district has made decisions at odds
with cases within its own district, as well as decisions at odds with those of
the second district. When faced with an opportunity to address the split in
the districts last January, rather than rectify the problem it helped to create,
the fourth district opted to further confuse an already unnecessarily
disconcerting area of law.
In Section II, this comment will survey, in addition to the RIS decision,
four of the most important decisions in this area, two of which came from
the second district, and two of which came from the fourth. Section EmI will
address the statutes that were controlling in each case, and Section IV will
address the question of whether the fourth district sought to create a third
type of condominium property not contemplated by the legislature.
H. THE CASES PRECEDING R!S
Although the fourth district previously decided at least two cases
concerning the point in time a condominium unit is created for purposes of
imposing assessment fees, in RIS, the court addressed only one of those
cases, apparently choosing to ignore the other. While the RIS decision is
based solely upon the fourth district's decision in Welleby Condominium
Ass'n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.,2 omitted from consideration-or at
least discussion-are the fourth district's decision in Winkelman v. TolP and
the second district's decisions in Hyde Park Condominium Ass'n v. Estero
1. 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
2. 522 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
3. 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
[Vol. 22:437
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Island Real Estate, Inc.4 and Estancia Condominium Assn v. Sunfield
Homes, Inc.5 Not surprisingly, Welleby is the single decision among the
aforementioned cases that is in concert with the fourth district's RS
decision. A brief synopsis of each pre-RIS decision, as well as the R!S
decision, follows.
A. Hyde Park Condominium Ass'n v. Estero Island Real Estate, Inc.
In Hyde Park Condominium Ass'n v. Estero Island Estate, Inc.,6 Hyde
Park appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of Estero Island Real
Estate. Pursuant to the summary judgment, the lower court declined to hold
Estero Island liable for assessments Hyde Park claimed were past due on
certain unimproved land owned by Estero Island. Estero Island acquired title
in November of 1981 to the subject unimproved real property located in
Hyde Park I Condominium, which was operated by the appellant. Estero
Island acquired title from Philip Werner, Jr., who was also an appellee in this
case. Werner acquired title in February of 1976. 7
In 1983, Hyde Park sought to recover from Estero Island past due
assessment fees from 1970 to 1983. Estero Island filed a notice of contest in
response to Hyde Park's Claim of Lien, and, in September of 1983, Hyde
Park issued a partial release of claim for assessments owed for the period of
1970 to February of 1976, when Werner acquired title. At that time, Hyde
Park filed a claim against the appellees for the assessments due from
February 1976 to 1983 and sought to foreclose upon the seven units owned
by Estero Island that.remained unimproved.8
The basis for Estero Island's refusal to pay was that, because the
property remained unimproved, the property constituted "lots" rather than
"units;" thus, according to Estero Island, because it owned "lots," it could
not be held liable for assessment fees to which only "units" were subject.
Upon the appellees' joint motion for summary judgment, the court agreed
that "the issue of law was whether the declaration of condominium provided
for assessments to come due against unimproved lots for proposed
apartments, or, whether the declaration only contemplated that assessments
were to be paid by 'completed apartments."' 9 Summary judgment was
entered in favor of the appellees.10
4. 486 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. 619 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
6. Hyde Park, 486 So. 2d at 1.
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Upon appeal to the second district, however, the lower court's decision,
which was premised upon section 711.03(7) of the Florida Statutes, was
reversed." The lower court had determined that the unimproved property
owned by Estero Island did not fall within the statutory definition of
condominium property, which is defined as "units of improvements."' 2 The
second district disagreed and found that, under the 1969 Condominium Act
which controlled in this case,
condominium property includes land, all improvements, all
improvements on the land, and all easements and rights with the
condominium .... A "unit" is that part of the condominium
property "which is to be subject to private
ownership."... Therefore, under the 1969 Act, the only type of
private ownership available within a condominium is a "unit." For
this court to hold otherwise would, in effect, create property
ownership rights which were not contemplated by either the
legislature or the Hyde Park Condominium declaration.3
Therefore, the second district determined that the unimproved lots owned by
Estero Island were indeed "units" within the meaning of the applicable
statute,'4 and HYde Park was indeed entitled to those past due assessment
fees it claimed.'
B. Welleby Condominium Ass'n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.
The next of the cases, Welleby Condominium Ass "n One, Inc. v. William
Lyon Co., was decided in 1987 by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
16
Welleby, the case upon which RIS was decided, involved a dispute between
the plaintiff condominium association, Welleby Condominium Association,
and the defendant land owner, the William Lyon Company. 17 The dispute
concerned assessment fees the Welleby Condominium Association levied
upon the unimproved lots owned by the William Lyon Company, all of
11. Hyde Park, 486 So. 2d at 2.
12. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(7) (1969).
13. Hyde Park, 486 So. 2d at 2. (citations omitted) (second emphasis added) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 711.03(9), (13) (1969)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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which were described in the declaration of condominium that was filed in
October of 1974.18
In March of 1986, Welleby filed Claims of Lien upon the subject land
for unpaid maintenance assessments, which it subsequently sought to
foreclose. Welleby alleged that the unimproved land owned by the
defendant was subject to such assessments pursuant to both section 718.116
of the Florida Statutes and the declaration of condominium. The defendant,
however, claimed that the unimproved land owned by it did not constitute
"'condominium parcels' or 'units"' as defined by either the declaration of
condominium or the Florida Statutes and, therefore, could not be subject to
the claimed assessments.
19
The fourth district determined that the issue before it was "whether the
landf owned by the [d]efendant [was] subject to assessments levied by the
[p]laintiff under the [d]eclaration of [c]ondominium and the Laws of
Florida., 20 In determining that the defendant land owner was not liable for
the claimed assessments, the court considered section 711.15(1) which read:
"A unit owner... shall be liable for all assessments coming due while he is
the owner of a unit."21 The court next considered section 711.03(15),22
which stated that a "'[u]nit' means a part of the condominium property
which is to be subject to private ownership. A unit may be in improvements,
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration."
23
The court next turned to the declaration for its definition of a "unit;"
however, the declaration, despite that section 711.15(1) holds "unit
owner[s]... liable for all assessments coming due... [,],24 failed to define or
mention "unit" or "unit owner." The court did recognize, however, that the
declaration, while "not us[ing] the word 'unit' as the object of
assessments[,] ... utilized the term 'condominium parcel' as the object of
assessments by the Condominium Association."2 This was determined by
the fourth district to be an intentional decision made by the scrivener of the
declaration as evidenced by the consistent and repeated use of the term, as
well as by the statement in the declaration that "'[t]he owner of each
18. Id. at 35-36.
19. Id. at36.
20. Id.
21. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at36 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.15(1) (Supp. 1974)).
22. This section, in effect at the time the declaration of condominium was recorded, is
presently codified at section 718.103(24) and has retained the exact language. FLA. STAT. §
718.103(24) (1995).
23. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 38 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974)).
24. Id. at36 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.15(1) (Supp. 1974)).
25. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 37.
1997]
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condominium parcel shall be liable to the condominium association for the
share of common expenses set forth.',
26
The declaration proceeded to define the term "condominium parcel" as
[a]n apartment together with the undivided share in the common elements
and all its easements, rights and interest which are pertinent to the
apartment."' 27  The declaration further defined "apartment" as an
.. [i]ndividual dwelling"' and, as the fourth district stated, "not raw,
unimproved lands."28  Accordingly, the court stated that the scrivener,
pursuant to section 711.03(15),29
chose to describe a "unit" in terms of a "condominium parcel",
which is an individual private dwelling. As permitted by [s]tatute,
this [d]eclaration specifically describes the object of assessments as
land and improvements, namely, an individual private dwelling,
and the use of the term "condominium parcel" is so specifically
used throughout this [d]eclaration of [c]ondominium, as to
preclude any other interpretation as to what the object of
assessments was to be against. Assessments, according to this
[d]eclaration, could not be assessed and levied against anything
other than an individual private dwelling, and the [d]eclaration
would not permit any interpretation allowing an assessment against
raw, unimproved lands upon which there is no private dwelling.
30
The fourth district did, however, recognize the very different decision
in Hyde Park, the most recent case at the time of the Welleby decision. The
Welleby court distinguished its decision from Hyde Park by relying upon the
statutory language contained in the sections that were in effect at the time of
each decision. In Hyde Park, the 1969 Condominium Act controlled, under
which section 711.03(13) defined "units" as including "any part of the
condominium property which was subject to private ownership."', This,
according to the fourth district, was a very broad definition that would
include unimproved property such as that at issue in Welleby and that,
therefore, the second district was correct in assessing the owner of




29. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974) (stating that a unit is as defined by the
declaration of condominium).
30. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 37.
31. Id. at 37-38.
32. Id. at 38.
[Vol. 22:437
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However, in Welleby, section 711.03(15), as opposed to section
711.03(13), was in effect, and the newer section defined "unit" differently.
The critical amendment, according to the fourth district, was the addition of
the phrase that "permitted a 'unit' to be described in any number of different
ways. 33 The court subsequently concluded that the declaration defined a
"'unit' as a private dwelling, thus exempting from an assessment, raw,
unimproved property' 34 and found that the Welleby Condominium
Association did not "have legal authority to levy assessment against the
[d]efendant's land. 35
C. Estancia Condominium Ass'n, v. Sunfield Homes, Inc.
In 1993, Estancia Condominium Ass' v. Sunfield Homes, Inc. was
decided.36 The second district rendered a decision consistent with its
decision in Hyde Park seven years earlier. In Estancia, the second district
reversed and remanded the case in which the appellee, Sunfield Homes,
despite failing to prove that "it was not the legal owner of twenty units [of
condominium property] under the applicable Florida Statutes and the
definition of 'unit' within the declaration[,J" 37 was declared exempt from
paying the assessment fees levied against it.
The declaration of condominium for Estancia Condominium was
recorded in 1981 and proposed a twelve-phase condominium. In 1983, an
amendment to the declaration was recorded that submitted to the
condominium the land for Buildings 200 and 600. Subsequently, in 1990,
Sunfield Homes purchased the land that had been dedicated to Building 600,
but upon which Building 600 had never been constructed. Accordingly, the
unimproved land remained subject to the declaration of condominium.
Upon acquiring title to the land, Estancia Condominium Association
began assessing Sunfield Homes for units 610-629. Sunfield Homes
subsequently refused to pay these assessments, and Estancia filed an action
to foreclose its lien upon such units for unpaid assessments. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of Sunfield Homes based primarily upon the
fourth district's holding in Welleby, which declared unimproved land
inconsistent with the definition of "unit" and, thus, immune to assessments. 0
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 38.
36. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1008.
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The second district recognized that Welleby was controlled by an earlier
version of the statutory definition of "unit" and that the case before them
concerned the 1981 version, codified at section 718.103(16) of the Florida
Statutes. This section defined "unit" as "a part of the condominium property
which is subject to exclusive ownership. A unit may be in improvements
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration.
'A
Further, the declaration in Estancia defined a "unit" as "'the part of the
condominium property which is to be subject to exclusive ownership'-a
definition which is indistinguishable from the definition in Hyde Park.
'A2
Thus, the second district declined "to decide in this case whether [it]
agree[d] with the Fourth District's decision in Welleby" and held, in
accordance with its decision in Hyde Park, that Sunfield Homes was liable
for the assessments levied upon its unimproved land by Estancia.
43
D. Winkelman v. Toll
The most recent of the cases preceding RIS was decided in 1995 by the
fourth district. Winkelman44 is a case that was surprisingly consistent with
previous second district decisions and inconsistent with the fourth district's
own decision in Welleby. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the Winkelman
court's only mention of Welleby is found in its sole footnote in which the
court summarily dismisses the Welleby decision with respect to its present
contrasting decision.45
In Winkelman, the trial court held that the unimproved land owned by
the appellees was not subject to assessment fees because the contemplated
units were never constructed.46 However, the fourth district reversed
"[b]ecause... the property was subjected to condominium ownership upon
the recording of the amendment to the declaration adding it to the
condominium."41 Therefore, although the units described in the declaration
and added to the condominium through an amendment were never
41. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1010 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) (1981)). It is
interesting to note that the words that were critical to the Welleby decision denying the
assessments are identical to the words in the newer version: ... as specified in the
declaration."
42. 619 So. 2d at 1010.
43. Id.
44. 661 So. 2d at 102.
45. Id. at 107 fn.1.
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constructed, they were sub ject to assessments, and the owner of the
unimproved land was liable.4
The declaration of condominium for Mission Lakes Condominium was
recorded in 1980. The declaration contemplated nine phases which were to
be submitted by amendment pursuant to section 718.403. 4  This section
permits the developer of a condominium to describe in the declaration the
proposed number of phases, but permits the contemplated units to escape
assessments until the developer adds the phases by amending the
declaration; hence, this section of the statute is titled "Phase
condominiums." 50 Accordingly, the developer recorded the declaration, and
thereby submitted phase H to condominium ownership. Just over one week
later, the developer recorded an amendment adding phases I and III through
VIII to the condominium.51 In compliance with the applicable statute, the
developer attached land surveyor certificates upon substantial completion of
phases I and ]I;52 however, the remaining phases were never constructed.
5 3
In 1985, the Winkelmans purchased all the units in phase I of the
condominium and purchased all the units in phase II the following year. In
1987, ICON Development Corporation, an appellee in this case, acquired all
the units in phases I through VII. According to the fourth district, "[t]he
deed to these phases described the property by their description as contained
in the amendment to the declaration of condominium, and the deed was
specifically subject to the declarationo of condominium and amendments
thereto.
54
In 1989, the Winkelmans filed suit to recover from ICON the
assessment fees for the percentage of the common expenses of the
condominium owned by ICON but for which the Winkelmans had been
paying. Several years after instituting this action, ICON filed a counterclaim
to quiet title claiming that it had acquired title in fee simple and not subject
to the condominium form of ownership. In finding for ICON, the trial court
determined that, according to the declaration of condominium, only upon
substantial completion of the units could a phase in which the units were to
48. Id.
49. FLA. STAT. § 718.403 (1979).
50. Id.
51. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 104.
52. Section 718.104(4)(e) of the Florida Statutes requires that, upon substantial
completion of each phase submitted to condominium ownership, a certificate of a registered
land surveyor be recorded as an amendment to the declaration of condominium. The phase
may, however, be added to the declaration prior to substantial completion. FLA. STAT. §
718.104(4)(e) (1979).
53. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 104.
54. Id. at 105.
19971
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be contained be submitted to condominium ownership. Furthermore, the
court relied upon sections 718.403(1) and (4) of the Florida Statutes for the
proposition that, because the subject property never became subject to the
condominium, the phases that were built acquired the entire interest in the
common elements for which they were assessed. 6 Thus, the court reasoned
that the units, by virtue of the declaration of condominium, could become
subject to the condominium only upon substantial completion and that,
because construction of the units never commenced, the units were never
substantially completed, the property in question was never subject to
condominium ownership, and ICON was not subject to the assessments that
the Winkelmans were attempting to recover.
57
However, upon appeal by the Winkelmans, the fourth district reversed
the lower court. Although section 718.103(16) permits the scrivener to
define a "unit" as "improvements, land, or land and improvements
together,... ,,58 it is crystal clear that "[i]t is the recording of the declaration
in the public records that subjects the property to condominium
ownership." 59 Further, because "[a] condominium is strictly a creature of
statute[,]'" 60 it is with the statute that the declaration must comply, and
should the declaration fail to do so, it is the statute that shall prevail.6
Accordingly, contrary to the findings of the lower court, the fourth district
found that, because section 718.104(2) of the Florida Statutes "mandates
that the condominium is created upon the recording of the declaration, the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 105. Section 718.403(1) states that
[a] developer may develop a condominium in phases, if the original declaration of
condominium submitting the initial phase to condominium ownership provides for and
describes in detail all anticipated phases; the impact, if any, which the completion of
subsequent phases would have upon the initial phase; and the time period within which each
phase must be completed.
Section 718.403(4) states that,
[i]f one or more phases are not built, the units which are built are entitled to 100 percent
ownership of all common elements within the phases actually developed and added as a part
of the condominium.
FLA. STAT. § 718.403(1), (4) (1979).
57. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105.
58. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) (Supp. 1980).
59. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1979)).
60. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105 (emphasis added) (citing Suntide Condominium
Ass'n v. Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 463
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certificate of substantial completion cannot be a condition precedent to the
creation of the condominium if it can be submitted at a later date."62
Additionally, section 718.110(3) similarly mandates that an amendment
to a declaration becomes effective upon recordation of the amendment
adding the subject property to the condominium, thereby subjecting it to the
declaration, as well.6  Therefore, as with section 718.104(2), failure to
improve the property already added to the condominium by amendment prior
to recordation of the amendment "does not prevent the inclusion of the land
in the condominium, because the amendment is effective when recorded." 64
To find otherwise would be to contradict the clear language of the statute.65
The fourth district found that the unconstructed phases owned by ICON
became subject to the declaration upon the recordation of the amendments
adding the phases and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with that finding.66 The court cited to Estancia for support for its finding
and briefly addressed, in a single footnote, its own decision in Welleby,
which the appellee ICON argued was inconsistent with both Estancia and
Hyde Park. While the court's decision in Welleby is contrary to its decision
in Winkelman, the court dismissed the contradiction by viewing Welleby as
having not addressed the issue of "whether the property dedicated to the
unconstructed units was part of the condominium. In fact, from a reading of
the opinion the court assumed that the property was part of the condominium
but not subject to assessments. 67 Thus, the fourth district, in a brief breath,
both contradicted and dismissed its perhaps iniquitous decision in Welleby
rather than seeking to rectify this past discrepancy.
E. RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of Business and
Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes
In RJS,68 the fourth district relied upon its decision in Welleby for
support and, at the same time, completely ignored its more recent decision in
Winkelman. Once again, the controversy involved whether the owner of
unimproved condominium property could be assessed for common expenses
on that property. RIS was the developer of the condominium at issue and
retained ownership of certain units. Although the subject units were
62. Id. at 106.
63. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 106 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.110(3) (1981)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 107.
67. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 107 fn.1.
68. 695 So. 2d at 357.
1997] 447
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eventually constructed, RIS failed to pay assessments on the units from the
time of recordation of the declaration of condominium until the time a
certificate of occupancy was issued on the units. RIS argued that it was not
until the certificate of occupancy was issued that the units were subject to
assessment fees, the time from which RIS did pay assessments.69
While the Department of Business and Professional Regulation,
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (the
"Department") determined that RIS was liable for the assessments from the
date of recordation of the declaration of condominium, the fourth district
disagreed and reversed the Department's ruling.70 In so finding, the court
compared RIS to its decision in Welleby in which it exempted from
assessments developer-owned unimproved land because the declaration
made reference only to "condominium parcel," as opposed to "unit," which
was defined as an apartment or individual dwelling unit, a definition into
which the court believed unimproved land did not fall. The court analogized
these cases on the premise that the RIS declaration also expounded a
definition of "unit" that was inconsistent with unimproved land upon which,
therefore, assessments could not be levied.71  However, while it is
questionable that the declaration in R!S even defined the term "unit," what
the RIS declaration did provide was a description of what will constitute a
unit upon completion:
Each unit consists of the dwelling applicable to the [u]nit, less that
portion of the basic Building structure for the dwelling lying within
each dwellings['] maximum dimension as shown on the survey
graphic description and plot plan attached hereto .... The
boundary lines of each [u]nit are the unfinished surface of the
ceilings and floors, perimeter walls and any interior walls that are
shown within the maximum limits of each unit on the plot plan.72
Together with this description, the court considered two additional clauses
found within the declaration:
2.2 The Condominium... is divided into 160 [u]nits
which.. [.J are shown in the survey of the land on which a graphic
description of the improvements in which the [u]nits are located
and a plot plan thereof which, together with this [d]eclaration are in
sufficient detail to identify the common elements and each [u]nit
69. RIS, 695 So. 2d at 358.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 358-59.
72. Id. at 359 (emphasis omitted) (quoting section 3.2 of the RIS declaration).
[Vol. 22:437
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and the relative location and the approximate dimensions
thereof.... Each unit shall be a part of the Condominium Parcel
which contains the [u]nit.
3.4 ... The Condominium Parcel, consisting of the [u]nit
together with the undivided share of the common elements which
are appurtenant to the [u]nit, and the limited common elements
which are appurtenant to the [u]nit, constitutes a separate parcel of
real property, the ownership of which is in fee simple.73
It is upon these portions of the declaration that the court found a "clear"
intent by the scrivener "not to include [raw, unimproved] land.., within the
definition of a unit."74  Accordingly, the fourth district reversed the
Department and held that, because raw land did not constitute a "unit"
subject to assessments, RIS owed no assessments."
III. APPLICABLE STATUTES
In Winkelman, the fourth district recognized that a condominium is
strictly a creature of statute and that any declaration in derivation of the
statute cannot control.76 However, only sixteen months later, the court, as it
did in Welleby, once again applied a misinterpretation of the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute it had not too long before confirmed
was controlling. While in RS the fourth district relied upon its decision in
Welleby, the court not only clearly ignored its contrary decision in
Winkelman only a short time earlier, but ignored the contrary decisions from
the second district in both Hyde Park and Estancia. Presented with an
opportunity to address the discrepancy within its own district, as well as
between the second and fourth districts, the court failed to do so and
succeeded only in adding more confusion to what should be a crystalline
area of law.
In Hyde Park and Estancia, the second district relied upon the
applicable statute in each case. In Hyde Park, the statute in effect at the time
the declaration was recorded was section 711.03(9)7 7 which stated, in
pertinent part, that "condominium property includes land, all improvements,
all improvements on the land, and all easements and rights with the
condominium."78  Further, "[a] 'unit' is that part of the condominium
73. Id.
74. RJS, 695 So. 2d at 359.
75. Id.
76. 661 So. 2d at 105.
77. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(9) (1969).
78. 486 So. 2d at 2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.03(9) (1969)).
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property 'which is to be subject to private ownership.' '79 Therefore, based
upon this simple statutory language, the court determined that a "unit" is the
only type of condominium property subject to private ownership and that "to
hold otherwise would, in effect, create property ownership rights which were
not contemplated by either the legislature or the Hyde Park Condominium
declaration[;]y 80 accordingly, the court held that, because they were subject
to private ownership, unimproved lots were indeed "units" and subject to
assessments pursuant to section 711.03 of the Florida Statutes.
8
'
Likewise, in Estancia, the court again relied upon the clear statutory
language in deciding that the unimproved condominium property at issue
was subject to assessments. The statute here in effect was section
718.103(16)82 of the 1981 Florida Statutes, which contained some of the
same language to define a "unit" as the 1969 statute that controlled in Hyde
Park: "[It is] a part of the condominium property which is subject to
exclusive ownership. A unit may be in improvements, land, or land and
improvements together, as specified in the declaration. 83  Due to the
addition of the phrase "as specified in the declaration[,]" the court
considered the definition of the term "unit" that was contained in the
declaration. Because the Estancia declaration defined "'unit' as 'the part of
the condominium property which is to be subject to exclusive
ownership[,]' 84 and because it is clear that the statute subjects unit owners
to assessment fees, the court again found that unimproved condominium
property that was subject to private ownership was also subject to
assessments.8 5
The Estancia court, while refraining from commenting on whether it
agreed with the fourth district's decision in Welleby, expressed concern that
Welleby served to create a type of condominium property that was not
created or contemplated by the legislature.8 6  The court in Welleby
determined that, because the Welleby declaration used the term
"condominium parcel," defined within the declaration as an individual
79. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 711.03(13) (1969)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) (1981).
83. Id.
84. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1010.
85. Id. at 1010.
86. Id. The Estancia court stated: "It is arguable that the [f]ourth [d]istrict's decision
[in Welleby] allowed the declaration of condominium to create a third type of condominium
property that was neither a unit nor a portion of the common elements." Id.
450 [Vol. 22:437
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private dwelling, rather than "unit" as used in the statute, unimproved
property was not subject to assessment fees.
However, the reasoning espoused by the fourth district in Winkelman is
much more on target. In Winkelman, it appears that the developer wanted to
phase the condominium development, but for some reason submitted the
phases to condominium ownership prior to the construction of the buildings
and units in those phases. Although the declaration stated that substantial
completion was a condition precedent to condominium ownership, as the
court correctly stated, "[i]t is the recording of the declaration in the public
records that subjects the property to condominium ownership."'88 Thus,
despite the contention of the declaration, because "the provisions of the
declaration must conform to the statutory requirements[] and[,] to the extent
that they conflict therewith, the statute must prevail[,]" upon recordation of
the amendment adding the phases to the condominium, the unimproved
property became subject to condominium ownership and, therefore, subject
to assessments.
90
In RIS the effective statute was chapter 718 of the 1987 Florida
Statutes, which is virtually the same as the 1995 Florida Statutes.9' While
these statutes are quite similar, where the legislature has seen fit to clarify or
amend various sections of the statute, courts should give effect to that
legislative intent as evidenced by the amendments.92 Under this chapter,
section 718.103(23), which is identical to section 718.103(24) of the current
statute, provides that a "'[u]nit' means a part of the condominium property
which is subject to exclusive ownership. A unit may be in improvements
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration.
93
This is identical to the statutory provisions effective in Welleby,94 Estancia,95
and Winkelman.96 While this provision is quoted and relied upon throughout
these decisions, what the courts in Welleby and RIS appear to have
87. 522 So. 2d at 37.
88. 661 So. 2d at 105.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FLA. STAT. § 718.101-.622 (1995); id. §718. 101-.622 (1987).
92. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order at 8,
Department of Bus. and Prof I Regulation, Div. of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and
Mobile Homes v. Sports Shinko (Florida) Co. Ltd., Case No. 96-001391 (State of Florida
Division of Administrative Hearings August 5, 1997) (No. 96-001391) (citing Rowles v. Div.
of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, 585 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991)).
93. Id. § 718.103(24) (1995); id. § 718.103(23) (1987).
94. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 35 (applying § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974)).
95. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1008 (applying § 718.103(16) (1981)).
96. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 102 (applying § 718.103(16) (Supp. 1980)).
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overlooked are some other important provisions within the same statutory
section. For instance, the legislature provides that the assessments at issue
in the foregoing cases are to be "assessed against the unit owner. 9 7
Additionally, a "'[c]ondominium' means that form of ownership of real
property.. ., which is comprised of units that may be owned by one or more
persons, and in which there is, appurtenant to each unit, an undivided share
in common elements[,] '98 and it is a "'declaration of condominium' ... by
which a condominium is created." 99 Thus, it is apparent upon the faces of
these sections that, upon the recording of the declaration, a condominium is
created, which includes the units that are to be assessed. However
conspicuous this conclusion may be, to avoid any confusion, the legislature
clearly codified it at section 718.104(2):
A condominium is created by recording a declaration .... Upon
the recording of the declaration, or an amendment adding a phase
to the condominium under § 718.403(6), all units described in the
declaration or phase amendment as being located in or on the land
then being submitted to condominium ownership shall come into
existence, regardless of the state of completion of planned
improvements in which the units may be located.' °
While the portion of this statute that reads "regardless of the state of
completion of planned improvements in which the units may be located" was
added in 1990 r01 and was a subsequent amendment to the statute that was in
97. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(1) (1995); id. § 718.103(1) (1987) (effective at the time the
RIS declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(1) (1981) (effective at the time the Estancia
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(1) (Supp. 1980) (effective at the time the Winkelman
declaration was recorded); id. § 711.03(1) (Supp. 1974) (effective at the time the Welleby
declaration was recorded); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1) (1969) (effective at the time the Hyde Park
declaration was recorded).
98. Id. § 718.103(10) (1995); id. § 718.103(9) (1987) (effective at the time the RIS
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(9) (1981) (effective at the time the Estancia
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(9) (Supp. 1980) (effective at the time the Winkelman
declaration was recorded); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(8) (Supp. 1974) (effective at the time the
Welleby declaration was recorded).
99. Id. § 718.103(14) (1995); id. § 718.103(13) (1987) (effective at the time the RIS
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(12) (1981) (effective at the time the Estancia
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(12) (Supp. 1980) (effective at the time the
Winkelman declaration was recorded); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1 1) (Supp. 1974) (effective at the
time the Welleby declaration was recorded); id. § 711.03(10) (1969) (effective at the time the
Hyde Park declaration was recorded).
100. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1995) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 718.104(2) (Supp. 1990).
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effect at the time of recordation of the RIS declaration, as previously
mentioned, courts, in determining the correct meaning of prior statute, not
only have the right but have the duty to consider such subsequent legislative
amendments for purposes of clarification of legislative intent.102 Thus, in
this case the fourth district had not only the right but the duty to consider this
clarification when making its decision. This it failed to do. As the
Department argues in its current case against Sports Shinko (Florida) Co., a
case in which the same statute was in effect at the time of recordation of
declaration as was in effect in RIS,
in determining legislative intent, the subsequent clarifying
amendments... should be considered in determining the proper
meaning to be given to [this] sectionfl as [it] existed in 1987 and
still exist[s] today.
The obvious purpose of these amendments should be given their
stated effect especially because the amended provisions reflect not
only the Division's unwavering interpretation of the statute but also
the intent of the [l]egislature that has been in effect all along.103
Accordingly, despite that the court in RS misconstrued the combined effect
of the various definitions contained within the condominium statutes, the
legislature proceeded to spell it out. However, it appears that the fourth
district chose to ignore this particular statutory section and create its own
laws for which there is absolutely no support other than its earlier misguided
decision in Welleby.
The R!S court further erred in its reasoning by basing its decision solely
upon the few provisions in the RIS declaration that discussed the boundaries
of a unit and the description of the condominium. The court cited to section
3.2 of the declaration, which discussed the boundaries of a unit, as its
primary support for its decision that, "in reading the declaration[,] ... the
term 'unit' was not meant to encompass raw land. 104 The court then, as
additional support, cited to two sections that describe the condominium and
a condominium parcel.10 5 While the fourth district found in these portions of
the declaration a "clear" intent "not to include [raw, unimproved] land by
102. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order at 8,
Department of Bus. and Prof I Regulation, Div. of Fla. Land Sales, Condominiums, and
Mobile Homes v. Sports Shinko (Florida) Co., Case No. 96-001391 (State of Florida Division
of Administrative Hearings August 5, 1997) (No. 96-001391) (citing Rowles v. Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 585 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. R/S, 695 So. 2d at 359; see also supra text accompanying note 72.
105. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 73.
1997]
17
Grant and Davis: RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of Business and Professi
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
itself within the definition of a unit[,] °"' 6 its finding is fallacious. As stated
by the Department in its pending case, pursuant to sections 718.403(2) and
(6) governing phase condominiums, the assertion of the fourth district and of
RIS
that the existence of plot plans, unit floor plans[,] and unit
boundaries in the [d]eclaration and its phase amendments is
evidence of intent that the units would come into existence at the
time of completion must ... fail as not supported by the statutory
scheme of the Condominium Act and provisions concerning phase
condominiums. The declaration or the amendment to the
declaration that provides for the phase condominium [] must
describe the land which may become part of the condominium and
the land on which each phase is to be built; the minimum and
maximum numbers and general size of units to be included in each
phase; each unit's percentage of ownership in the common
elements as each phase is added; the recreational areas and
facilities which will be owned as common elements by all unit
owners, and the membership vote and ownership in the association
attributable to each unit in each phase.
107
Thus, it is clear that the section of the RIS declaration that the fourth
district itself recognized as "discuss[ing] the boundaries of a unit"'08 cannot
be construed as evidencing an intention that a unit must be substantially
completed before assessment fees may be levied. Contrariwise, this type of
boundary description, as well as the additional descriptions cited by the
fourth district in support of its finding, is currently mandated by the Florida
Statutes, as it was in 1987 when the RIS declaration was recorded. 0 9
Accordingly, the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, on yet
another statutory ground, is erroneous and unsupported.
Additionally, the proffered reasoning in Welleby, upon which RIS was
decided, is painfully fallacious. The court refers to section 711.03(15), the
same language that was applicable in both Estancia and Winkelman, which
permits the scrivener, in the declaration, to define a "unit" as improvements
and/or land.1 0 However, because the scrivener used the term "condominium
106. RIS, 695 So. 2d at 359.
107. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order at 16-17,
Sports Shinko (No. 96-001391) (emphasis added).
108. RJS, 695 So. 2d at 359.
109. Sections 718.403(2) and (6) contain identical language in both 1987 and the
current edition. FLA. STAT. § 718.403(2), (6) (1987); id. § 718.403(2), (6) (1995).
110. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974).
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parcel" throughout the Welleby declaration and never used the term "unit,"
the court relied solely upon the definition of "condominium parcel" under
the declaration which read: "An apartment together with the undivided share
in the common elements and all its easements, rights and interest which are
pertinent to the apartment."' ,' In turn, an "apartment" was defined as an
"[i]ndividual private dwelling."' 1 2 Thus, because the scrivener "chose to
describe a 'unit' in terms of a 'condominium parcel', which is an individual
private dwelling[,]"' 3 it was only an individual private dwelling that could
be subject to assessments and not unimproved land.
However, while section 711.103(15),as have its preceding statutes since
Winkelman, grants to the scrivener the authority to define a "unit" in a
couple of different ways, what the statute does not do is grant to the
scrivener the power or authority to determine what property is to be subject
to assessments." 4 Section 718.103(1) very clearly states, as it always has,
that it is units, not condominium parcels or any other property, that shall be
subject to assessments' 15. Additionally, the statute defines, as it always has,
"condominium parcel" as specifically including a "unit; '16 thus, within the
term "condominium parcel" is a unit, and a "condominium parcel" by its
very definition is subject to assessments. Therefore, regardless of how a
"unit" or "condominium parcel" is defined, upon recordation of the
declaration, a condominium, and therefore a unit, comes into existence and
is subject to assessments. Again, because a court has the right and duty to
consider subsequent statutory amendments, while many of the statutory
provisions remained the same, if any provisions were subsequently amended,
the fourth district was obligated to consider these amended statutory
provisions and failed to do so.
IV. IF IT'S NOT A UNIT, WHAT IS IT?
The condominium statutes have always contemplated only two types of
property that are subject to condominium ownership: units and common
111. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 37.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 711.103(15) (1995).
115. Id. § 718.103(1) (1995); id. § 718.103(1) (1987); id. § 718.103(1) (1981); id. §
718.103(1) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1) (Supp. 1974); id. § 711.03(1) (1969).
116. This section states: "'Condominium parcel' means a unit, together with the
undivided share in the common elements which is appurtenant to the unit." Id. § 718.103(11)
(1995); id. § 718.103(10) (1987); id. § 718.103(10) (1981); FLA. STAT. § 718.103(10) (Supp.
1980); id. § 711.03(9) (Supp. 1974); id. § 711.03(8) (1969).
1997]
19
Grant and Davis: RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of Business and Professi
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review [Vol. 22:437
elements." 7  Furthermore, while one may own an "undivided share in
common elements[,]"' 1 8 which are "the portions of the condominium
property which are not included in the units[,]""' 9 it is only the units that are
"subject to exclusive ownership.' l20 Thus, it logically follows that any
portion of condominium property that is exclusively owned must be a unit,
the only other type of condominium property being common elements which
are not subject to exclusive ownership.
However, the fourth district, in both Welleby and RIS, determined that
the condominium property that was subject to exclusive ownership in each
case was not units subject to assessments; 121 further, the court failed to
117. This section states: "'Condominium' means that form of ownership of real
property which is created pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, which is comprised of
units that may be owned by one or more persons, and in which there is, appurtenant to each
unit, an undivided share in common elements." Id. § 718.103(10) (1995); id. § 718.103(9)
(1987); FLA. STAT. § 718.103(9) (1981); id. § 718.103(9) (Supp. 1980); id. § 711.03(8)
(Supp. 1974); id. § 711.03(7) (1969).
118. Id.
119. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(7) (1995); id. § 718.103(6) (1987); id. § 718.103(6) (1981);
id. § 718.103(6) (Supp. 1980); id. § 711.03(5) (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(4) (1969).
120. Id. § 718.103(24) (1995).
121. In Welleby, the fourth district interestingly stated that, although the William Lyon
Company "was the owner of certain real property... described as follows: Units #101, #102,
#103, #104, #105, #203, #204, #401, #402, #421, and #422, of Welleby Townhome
Condominium One," 522 So. 2d at 36 (emphasis added), because the land described as the
aforementioned units had no construction upon it, and because the "scrivner (sic) of this
declaration sought to define a 'unit' as a private dwelling, [thereby] exempting from an
assessment, raw, unimproved property[,]" id. at 38, the units exclusively owned by the
William Lyon Company were not the units that were meant to be subject to assessments and
were, therefore, exempt. Id.
Similarly, in RIS, the fourth district once again demonstrated its lack of understanding of
this area of the law in finding that the developer-owned condominium property, which had
been submitted to condominium ownership upon the recording of the declaration, was not
subject to assessments because the buildings containing the units had not yet been constructed.
695 So. 2d at 359. This finding was based primarily upon the description of the boundaries of
a unit found within the RIS declaration, which discussed that
[e]ach unit [would] consist[] of the dwelling applicable to the [u]nit, less that portion of the
basic Building structure for the dwelling lying within each dwellings[] maximum dimension as
shown on the survey graphic description and plot plan... [and that] [t]he boundary lines of
each [u]nit [would consist of] the unfinished surface of the ceilings and floors, perimeter walls
and any interior walls that are shown within the maximum limits of each unit on the plot plan.
Id. Thus, because this description of the boundaries of a unit contemplated a completed unit,
the court determined that the scrivener meant only to subject completed units to assessments,
apparently completely ignorant of the section that requires the declaration to include such "a
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indicate what, if not units, the William Lyon Company and RIS owned. In
both cases, the declaration had been recorded, which, by statute, served to
create the condominium.12 2 Additionally, applicable to RIS, it was upon the
recording of the declaration that "all units described in the
declaration[s] .., as being located in or on the land then being submitted to
condominium ownership ... [came] into existence, regardless of the state of
completion of planned improvements in which the units may be located."1 3
Accordingly, the units described in the RIS declaration, despite having not
yet been constructed, were created at the time the declaration was recorded
and, since the only condominium property that has ever been subject to
exclusive ownership is units, it was only these unconstructed units that the
parties in Welleby and RIS could possibly have owned. Therefore, because
the William Lyon Company, in Welleby, and RIS, in RIS, could only have
owned units, and because the condominium statutes effective in both cases
dictated that unit owners are "liable for all assessments which come due
while [they are] the unit owner[s][,]" 124 the decision the fourth district
reached in these two cases could not have been arrived at logically.
What the fourth district has seemingly done is, as the second district has
pointed out, "allowo the declaration of condominium to create a third type
of condominium property that [is] neither a unit nor a portion of the common
elements[,]' 125 and for which there is no statutory authority. In fact, it was
precisely this result that the second district sought to avoid in its decision in
Hyde Park- "[T]he only type of private ownership available within a
condominium is a 'unit.' For this court to hold otherwise would, in effect,
create property ownership rights which were not contemplated by either the
legislature or the Hyde Park Condominium declaration." 26 It is unfortunate
that the fourth district does not share the second district's understanding of
the condominium statute.
graphic description of the improvements in which units are located." FLA. STAT. §
718.104(4)(e) (1995).
122. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1995); id. § 718.104(2) (1987) (stating that "[a]
condominium is created by recording a declaration").
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 718.116(1)(a) (1995); id. § 718.116(1)(a) (1987); id. § 711.15(1) (Supp.
1974).
125. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1010 (commenting on the fourth district's decision in
Welleby).
126. 486 So. 2d at 2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.03(4), (9), (13) (1969)).
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V. CONCLUSION
The condominium statute permits a developer to create a condominium
with land as a unit, or improvements as a unit, or both land and
improvements as a unit.127 However, the statute does not permit a developer
to create a condominium and have units which are not subject to
assessments; 28 only common elements are not subject to assessments. 29
Through its RIS decision, the fourth district has once again demonstrated its
total lack of understanding of a very basic premise of condominium law-
one that every attorney who practices in this area, whether representing
developers or associations, understands-unless, of course, the attorney is
arguing before a court on behalf of a unit owner who seeks to avoid his or
her assessment obligation. Unless and until the fourth district recognizes the
error of its ways or the Supreme Court of Florida agrees to tackle the
daunting task of clarifying-apparently for the benefit of the misguided
fourth district-the clear language of the condominium statute, those
unfortunate enough to have to appear before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal will be hard-pressed to obtain a logical and legitimate-or even a
consistent-ruling regarding condominium assessments.
127. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(24) (1995); id. § 718.103(23) (1987).
128. Section 718.116(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides an exception to this
rule: "No unit owner may be excused from the payment of his share of the common expense
of a condominium unless all unit owners are likewise proportionately excused from payment,
except as provided [in this section]." Id. § 718.1 16(9)(a) (1995). The section then provides
exceptions for developer-owned units where the developer guarantees the assessments. Id.
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